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The relationship between William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-
1951) has recently been the subject of intense scholarly research. We know for 
instance that the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of psychology 
found in James a major source of inspiration. Not surprisingly therefore, the 
pragmatist nature of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is increasingly 
acknowledged, in spite of Wittgenstein’s adamant refusal of being labeled a 
"pragmatist". In this brief paper I merely want to piece together some of the 
available evidence of Wittgenstein's high regard for William James, not only for 
his thoughts, but even more so for his character. 
 
The first reference to James in Wittgenstein's papers is found in a letter of 
June 22, 1912, to Bertrand Russell. In that letter, written in Cambridge 
(England), after reporting to Russell the discussion he had with the psychologist 
Charles S. Myers about the relations between logic and psychology, 
Wittgenstein adds that, whenever he has the time, he reads James' Varieties of 
Religious Experience. Moreover, he offers the following comment: "This book 
does me a lot of good. I don't mean to say that I will be a saint soon, but I am not 
sure that it does not improve me a little in a way in which I would like to 
improve very much: namely I think that it helps me to get rid of the Sorge (in the 
sense in which Goethe used the word in the 2nd part of Faust)."1 McGuinness 
suggests that the young Wittgenstein may have recognized his own condition in 
the description of "The Sick Soul" which William James gives in the sixth and 
seventh lectures of that book2. Those memorable Jamesian pages may have  been 
experienced by Wittgenstein as an explanation of, as well as a relief from his 
permanent dissatisfaction with his work and his compulsive need to both give 
and receive affection. His student O'C. Drury —who was urged by Wittgenstein 
to abandon philosophy and to go into medicine— remembers that Wittgenstein 
suggested to him in 1930 to read James' book3. Moreover—as Haack notes4— 
Wittgenstein must have felt sympathetic to The Varieties of Religious 
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Experience for James' rejection of the idea of an essence of 'religion' and to the 
suggestion that diverse religious experiences may have certain "family 
resemblances". 
 
We also know that, at some time of the second period of Wittgenstein's 
stay in Cambridge during the thirties, James' Principles of Psychology was —as 
one of his former pupils A. C. Jackson told John Passmore5— the only 
philosophical work that was to be seen on his bookshelves. According to 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Wittgenstein read the abridged version of James, entitled 
Psychology: The Briefer Course, which was familiarly known amongst the 
students as the "Jimmy" to distinguish it from the heavy two volume edition6,  In 
fact, William James is already mentioned in the second page of the Brown Book, 
the lectures of the 1934-35 course, when Wittgenstein refers to James' thesis 
regarding the specific feelings accompanying the use of words such as 'and', 'if' 
and 'or', and again in the pages where Wittgenstein echoes James’ well known 
position that "a man doesn't cry because he is sad but that he is sad because he 
cries"7. 
 
In Philosophical Investigations James is quoted four times (as many as 
Frege), and The Principles of Psychology is alluded to more frequently than any 
other text in the entire course of the book. Peter Geach and his collaborators 
identified more than thirty passages of The Principles which have a parallel in 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and in Zettel8. Also, a great number 
of Wittgenstein's notes in his manuscripts 130-138 are related to James, although 
—as Schulte notices9— its real Jamesian source is not always evident. In the 
roughly 120 notebook pages written from May through September of 1946, 
Wittgenstein argues with James intermittently but consistently, and such 
persistent interest for another author is absolutely exceptional in Wittgenstein10. 
According to Monk, Wittgenstein had even thought of using The Principles as a 
course text in order to illustrate the conceptual confusions that he was trying to 
fight, but in the end —as he told Rhees— he preferred to talk just from his own 
head11. In short, during his last years of his life Wittgenstein very often referred 
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to James in his lectures12, and—to everybody's astonishment— on one occasion 
he even referred to an exact page number!13 
 
Perhaps the distance between Wittgenstein and pragmatism may be 
understood in terms of James' view of the two different traditions of doing 
philosophy, which he expressed in his well known distinction between two types 
of mental make-up, the tough-minded, characterized by its empiricism of facts, 
and the tender-minded, defined by some intellectual going by principles. James' 
point is that his new pragmatism provides a middle way which enables one to 
overcome the shortcomings typical of these two make-ups14. In some sense, the 
later Wittgenstein also tried to overcome the shortcomings of these two 
alternatives. He certainly considered his Tractatus as an example of a 
miscarriage of the dogmatic tough-minded make-up, and, as a result, me maybe 
came closer to the tender-minded one. No doubt, the difference of temperaments 
between James and Wittgenstein is great; but Wittgenstein’s affective 
acknowledgement of James’s relevance makes it possible to detect some real 
affective community between them. As Goodman rightly observes, Wittgenstein 
treats William James as a wise master, although sometimes as a miscarried one15. 
 
Wittgenstein was also fond of the powerful narrative style of William 
James, but above all he admired James as a person. His admiration was not 
confined to the recognition of James' authority in psychology, but above all he 
saw in James the good person that he would like to have been. This is born out 
by the comment which he made to Drury: "That is what makes him [James] a 
good philosopher; he was a real human being"16. That, to use Hilary Putnam’s17 
words, the deepest philosopher of the twentieth century had such high regard for 
William James, may be seen as an invitation to read James again, and to 
discover the real person he was. 
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